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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of the differ-
ent property rights models of credit institutions (public, private, cooperative or mutual)
in their credit policy and investment behaviour and in response to the current crisis
and regulatory framework adjustments. Taking Portuguese credit institutions as the
object, it concludes that overall banks’ business models are qualitatively identical and
their lending and investment behaviours are similar, except for the saver profile of
cooperative banks and the deeper focus on loans to customers to the detriment of fi-
nancial investments of the mutual savings banks. Moreover, the reactions to the crisis
were equivalent, except for the state-owned banks, which presented the most favourable
reaction, albeit not deep enough to be significant.
Unterschiede im Kreditvergabe- und Investitionsverhalten
portugiesischer Kreditinstitute in einer Zeit der Krise
Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, den Einfluss der verschiedenen Property Rights Modelle von Kreditin-
stituten (o¨ffentliche, private, genossenschaftliche oder auf Gegenseitigkeit basierende) auf deren
Kreditpolitik und Investitionsverhalten angesichts der gegenwa¨rtigen Krise und der A¨nderungen
des regulatorischen Rahmens zu untersuchen. Betrachtet man die portugiesischen Kreditinstitute,
kommt man zu dem Schluss, dass allgemein die Gescha¨ftsmodelle der Banken identisch sind und
ihr Investitionsverhalten a¨hnlich ist, mit Ausnahme der Sparerprofile von Genossenschaftsbanken
und des sta¨rkeren Fokus auf Kundendarlehen statt auf Finanzanlagen bei den Spar- und Darlehen-
skassen auf Gegenseitigkeit. Auch waren die Reaktionen auf die Krise gleichartig, mit Ausnahme
der staatlichen Banken, die am positivsten reagierten, allerdings nicht durchgreifend genug, um
signifikant zu sein.
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Las diferencias de comportamiento en las polı´ticas de pre´stamo y
inversio´n de las instituciones de cre´dito portuguesas en una e´poca de
recesio´n
El propo´sito de este trabajo es investigar la influencia de los diferentes modelos de los derechos de
propiedad de las instituciones de cre´dito (pu´blica, privada, cooperativa o mutua) en su polı´tica de
cre´dito y comportamiento de inversio´n y en respuesta a la crisis actual y a los ajustes del marco
regulatorio. Tomando las entidades de cre´dito portuguesas como objeto llega a la conclusio´n de que,
globalmente, los bancos siguen un modelo de negocio cualitativamente ide´ntico y el comportamiento
de pre´stamo e inversio´n son similares, excepto los bancos cooperativos que ostentan un perfil de
ahorro, y el banco de ahorro mutuo que presenta un enfoque ma´s profundo en pre´stamos a clientes en
detrimento de las inversiones financieras. Por otra parte, las reacciones a la crisis eran equivalentes,
a excepcio´n del banco de propiedad estatal, que presento´ la reaccio´n ma´s favorable, aunque no
suficientemente profunda como para ser esta´ticamente significativa.
Les diffe´rences de comportement dans les politiques de preˆt et
d’investissement des institutions de cre´dit portuguaises en temps
de re´cession
L’objectif de cet article est d’e´tudier l’influence des diffe´rents mode`les des droits de proprie´te´ des
institutions de cre´dit (publiques, prive´es, coope´ratives ou mutuelles) sur leur politique de cre´dit
et le comportement d’investissement, dans le contexte actuel de crise et d’ajustement du cadre
re´gulateur. Conside´rant les institutions de cre´dit portugaises, nous arrivons a` la conclusion que,
globalement, les banques suivent un “business model” qualitativement identique. Par ailleurs leurs
comportements de preˆt et d’investissement sont similaires, excepte´ pour les banques coope´ratives qui
montrent un comportement davantage tourne´ vers l’e´pargne et pour les banques d’e´pargne mutuelles
qui accordent plus d’importance aux preˆts des clients qu’aux investissements financiers. En outre,
les re´actions a` la crise e´taient e´quivalentes, a` l’exception des banques publiques qui pre´sentaient
la re´action la plus favorable bien que la diffe´rence ne soit pas suffisamment importante pour eˆtre
statistiquement significative.
1 Introduction
The 2008 global crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis that followed it
produced, among other consequences, general mistrust in financial institutions. Banks’
greedy investment policy led them into trouble and taxpayers paid the bill, with govern-
ments ending up bailing them out. These events encouraged the debate on the economic
role of banks and other credit institutions as rational economic agents answering to
society needs and key players in the challenges of economic and social development.
The Portuguese financial system includes credit institutions and financial compa-
nies. Among the credit institutions, the domestic ones dominate the market; particularly,
a state-owned bank, several private investor-owned firm (IOF) banks, a mutual savings
bank and an agricultural credit cooperative banking system stand out. In Portugal, like
in many other countries, cooperative and mutual savings banks, which, in the past,
were not considered the most efficient or innovative, were generally able to avoid many
of the mistakes made by larger IOF banks and have weathered the crisis better, proving
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that they are (still) a valid business alternative. Consequently, while larger universal
banks exhibited overall negative profits in 2011, savings and cooperative banks were
among the few banks presenting positive net returns. But what are these institutions’
distinctive features? Why they are standing firm and even, in some cases, increasing
their market shares, when others are drowning in the crisis and struggling to survive?
Furthermore, what can the other financial institutions learn from them?
By allocating capital to individuals and businesses that want to make productive
use out of it, financial institutions create social value and, in this way, play an important
role in the economic and social development of a country or region. However, the finan-
cial crisis of 2008 is the latest proof that finance today takes on a wholly different and
less socially conscious meaning. In particular, in Portugal, during this crisis, the finan-
cial institutions often played the role of the ‘bad guy’: in the early days because of their
recklessness and somewhat pushy credit-granting practices, which contributed to the
over-indebtedness of Portuguese families; nowadays because of their restrictive lending
policies, which are strangling small and medium-sized enterprises while the press re-
veals banks’ earnings with Portuguese sovereign debt. The general public opinion judges
banks’ behaviour severely, and politicians have made banks’ granting of loans strategy
part of their political agenda. Meanwhile, banks are making efforts contrary to this view
by developing and publicizing partnerships and programmes to finance microcredit and
small business enterprises.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of the different prop-
erty rights models of credit institutions (public, private, cooperative or mutual) on their
lending and investment behaviour and in response to the current crisis and regulatory
framework adjustments. In methodological terms, the paper examines the banking sit-
uation in Portugal by using financial indicators, prior to and after the 2008 financial
crisis.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 consists of a literature review on credit
institutions’ ownership and their lending and investment behaviours; section 3 presents
the regulatory framework and some historic data on the Portuguese banking system;
section 4 includes the empirical work; and section 5 concludes.
2 Credit institutions’ ownership and lending and investment behaviour: a
literature review
The financial system and the banks within it play a crucial role in the economy,
enabling people to invest their resources to earn income in the future and increasing
investment and entrepreneurship. The modern theory of financial intermediation ex-
plains the existence of financial institutions by the presence of certain forms of market
imperfection, for example asymmetric information.
The rationale of financial intermediaries relies on their effectiveness and efficiency
in reducing these imperfections more effectively and at a lower cost than individual bor-
rowers or lenders can, thanks to their structure and organization, allowing them to
reduce the risks of investment and the costs of information and ultimately allowing bet-
ter allocation of resources (Benston and Smith 1976, Goodhart 1989). Indeed, financial
intermediaries, through screening and monitoring practices, are able to minimize infor-
mation costs efficiently by exploiting economies of scale in information collection and
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production, avoiding free-rider problems and the duplication of monitoring by individ-
uals and with the advantage that no ‘private’ information is disclosed, thus protecting
borrowers’ privacy (Boscia and Di Salvo 2009).
Traditional banks (investor-owned and profit-maximizing) are one of the most an-
cient forms of capitalistic organization, existing well before the Industrial Revolution.
With the global expansion of market economies around the world, other organizational
forms, like cooperative and mutual savings banks, have emerged, competing success-
fully, mainly in retail banking. This variety of organizational forms may be explained
by both government regulation and other forms of protection or by the specific mar-
ket failures (asymmetric information) that are successfully addressed by these different
organizational forms. In this way, the recent economic literature has argued that owner-
ship structures and organizational forms are indeed an endogenous result of the rational
choices made by agents facing market failures (Boscia and Di Salvo 2009, Cabo 2012,
Cuevas and Fisher 2006). Cuevas and Fischer (2006) identified three complementary
theories to understand how institutional features deal with market failures: the agency
theory, the property rights theory and the transaction costs theory. The agency theory
suggests that a cooperative or mutual bank experiences lower agency costs mainly due
to the ‘peer-monitoring’ mechanism, which reduces asymmetric information and mon-
itoring costs, and to the alignment of members’ and management risk behaviour, as a
consequence of the banks’ mutuality feature. Moreover, a cooperative bank may present
lower agency costs as a consequence of its more efficient internal decision-making pro-
cess, since the chain of decisions is usually shorter than in IOFs, reducing the level
of separation between ownership and management (Boscia and Di Salvo 2009, Bunger
2009, Fonteyne 2007, Kane and Hendershott 1996, Stiglitz 1990). The property rights
theory suggests that the separation between owners and managers in a cooperative or
mutual bank may be reduced by appointing only members as managers and fostering
members’ participation in the annual general assembly and other business meetings
(Boscia and Di Salvo 2009). The transaction costs economics indicate that the proximity
of the bank and the peculiar nature of the customer relationship give the cooperative or
mutual bank some transaction-cost-specific advantages relative to IOFs (Boscia and Di
Salvo 2009, De Bruyn and Ferri 2005, Fonteyne 2007).
The distinct policies of credit granting and financial investment behaviour (Ferri
et al. 2014) due to the differences in the credit institutions’ mission/ownership form (for
profit or not for profit, private or public) suggest that stakeholder banks not only have a
business model that is different from that of shareholder banks, but also differ from them
in terms of their business objective and ownership structure (Beck et al. 2009, Hesse and
Ciha´k 2007). Shareholder banks’ or IOF banks’ primary objective is to maximize the prof-
its and capital return to shareholders, and they do so often through speculative trading
activities on the financial market (Paulet and Relano 2010). On the contrary, stakeholder
banks, such as cooperative and mutual savings banks, being not-for-profit institutions,
pursue a twofold objective, providing the community (members/customers and local
population) with both economic and social benefits. Therefore, they should concentrate
on less risky activities, such as retail banking (Hesse and Ciha´k 2007), privileging the
social or regional dimension of the projects that they finance. Stakeholder banks are
more involved in relationship lending and thus hold longer-term objective functions than
shareholder banks and could be more prone to smoothing out financial constraints for
their borrowers in order to maximize the long-term values of their borrower–lender
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relationships (Boot 2000, Petersen and Rajan 1994). Stakeholder banks could thus be
more willing to sacrifice other assets in order to keep their lending volume intact. On
the contrary, shareholder banks, while focusing on maximizing profits, could then cut
back lending more easily if that would result in lower short-term costs (following the
theory of the bank capital channel). On the other hand, Ko¨hler (2014), analyzing the
impact of business models on bank stability, stated that banks will be significantly
more stable and profitable if they increase their share of non-interest income (financial
investment), indicating that substantial benefits are to be gained from income diver-
sification, particularly for savings and cooperative banks, which are traditionally more
retail-oriented credit institutions.
Moreover, the government can use state-controlled banks to compensate for mar-
ket failures, such as externalities, that can lead to a lack of financing for socially prof-
itable projects (Sapienza 2004). Thus, a public bank should incorporate the government
guidelines for the economic and social development of the country into its mission. In
this way, although still being for profit, public banks should behave differently from IOF
banks, respecting the ‘less profit, more sense’ principle. Indeed, it is supposed that state-
controlled banks boost their lending during a crisis to support the economy (Funga´cˇova´
et al. 2013), as the objective function of state-controlled banks is likely to include sta-
bilization of the economy. As a consequence, the government may be willing to limit a
credit contraction in troubled times.
The literature contains numerous instances concerning the differences in bank
lending and investment policies across banks of different ownership forms. Gambacorta
and Mistrulli (2004) studied the response to monetary policy and business cycles of
Italian banks, concluding that non-cooperative banks behave more pro-cyclically when
supplying credit, due to their stronger dependency on non-deposit forms of external
funds and their lower proportion of long-term lending relationships. Ferri et al. (2014),
analyzing the differences in bank lending supply responses to changes in monetary pol-
icy, found that stakeholder banks try to smooth out the financial conditions for their
customers in order to maintain longer-term borrower–lender relationships by conduct-
ing less procyclical loan supply policies and being less strict about credit standards,
irrespective of the economic or financial situation. Further, this tendency was stronger
for cooperative banks during the recent crisis relative to savings banks. Their results
indicate that the presence of stakeholder-oriented banks can dampen the volatility of
lending. The authors state that this finding, together with other evidence on the positive
effects coming from the presence of stakeholder banks, should lead to the reconsidera-
tion of the role of stakeholder banks in a modern financial system. Micco and Panizza
(2006) found that the lending of state-owned banks is less sensitive to macroeconomic
shocks than that of private banks. In addition, Bertay et al. (2012) concluded that lend-
ing by state-owned banks is less procyclical than lending by private banks, especially
in countries with good governance. These findings reinforce the view that state-owned
banks consider macroeconomic stabilization in their objective function.
3 Overview of the Portuguese banking sector
The activity of institutions operating in the Portuguese financial system is ruled
by the Legal Framework of Credit Institutions and Financial Companies (RGICSF),
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approved by Decree-Law No. 298/92 and amended subsequently, which lays down the
conditions for the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions and fi-
nancial companies. Among credit institutions, companies engaging in business activity
that consists of accepting deposits and other repayable funds from the public in order
to invest them on their own account by granting loans, banks, savings banks and agri-
cultural credit cooperative banks stand out. The latter of these, given their mutuality
feature and specific purpose, are subject to a specific law, namely the Legal Framework
of Savings Banks, approved by the Decree-Law No. 136/79 and posterior amendments
for mutual savings banks, and the Legal Framework of Mutual Agricultural Credit and
Mutual Agricultural Credit Banks, approved by Decree-Law No 24/91 and subsequently
amended.
Overall, in 2011, Portuguese financial service activities (except insurance and
pension funding and including the activities carried out by the Bank of Portugal) con-
tributed to approximately 6% of the national gross value added. This weight is relatively
high when compared with other euro area countries (APB 2012a). Table 1 presents a
picture of the Portuguese banking system by origin/type of legal structure. Institutions
set up under Portuguese law, especially domestic institutions, predominated in the
total number and value of aggregate assets in all the size categories and engaged in
multiproduct activity (APB 2012b).
Table 1 – The Portuguese banking system at 31 December 2011
By No. of Entities
Domestic 69
Subsidiary 9
Branch office 27
Total 105
By Assets (Million €)
Domestic 401,190
Subsidiary 68,733
Branch office 43,246
Total 513,169
Source: Adapted from APB (2012b)
With regard to size, measured by the value of assets, the banking system is rela-
tively asymmetrical (Figure 1): 94.3% of the aggregate assets of the Portuguese banking
system are concentrated in 13 large and medium-sized institutions, while the remaining
20 small financial institutions together have a market share of only 5.7%.
Despite the concentration of assets, the analysis of the credit institutions’ branch
network shows that there is considerable homogeneity between the number of each credit
institution’s branches, which points to the existence of greater competition between the
institutions in the retail banking market and in attracting business through the branch
network as opposed to other types of banking activity (APB 2012b).
The year 2011 was especially difficult for Portugal, with several external and
internal circumstances having repercussions for the banking industry, especially for
banks’ business activity, funding and performance, thus explaining the negative returns
presented by the overall banking system. Particularly, the structural imbalances in the
Portuguese economy, reflected by high levels of public and private borrowing in a context
© 2015 The Authors
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics © 2015 CIRIEC
DIFFERENCES IN LENDING BEHAVIOUR CREDIT INSTITUTIONS’ 7
Figure 1 – Concentration of aggregate assets by size of credit institutions at 31
December 2011
Source: APB (2012b)
of slim economic growth and deteriorating perception of the credit risk of sovereign
debt, made Portugal’s finance conditions in the international markets too severe and
obliged the country to request foreign financial assistance in April 2011. From mid-year,
the Economic Adjustment Programme (EAP) negotiated with the Troika (International
Monetary Fund, European Union and European Central Bank) and imposed an extra
need for the banking institutions to adjust their activity. This programme obliged banks
to fulfil a number of new prudential requirements: a) increasing their minimum core
tier 1 capital ratio1 to 9% and 10% by the end of 2011 and 2012, respectively; b) reducing
their transformation ratio2 to 120% by December 2014; c) conducting inspections to
assess their credit portfolios as of 30 June 2011 as part of the Banco de Portugal Special
Inspection Programme for the eight largest banking groups; and (d) reviewing the system
for the reorganization and winding-up of financial institutions set out in the RGICSF in
order to strengthen bank recovery and resolution mechanisms (APB 2012b, c).
Additionally, the EAP reinforced the support for Portuguese banks with: a) the
provision of an extraordinary state guarantee on bond issues by the banking sector,
while the EAP laid down the possibility of banks issuing state-guaranteed debt to a
maximum of 35 billion euros; and b) the availability of a fund for recapitalization of
credit institutions to the amount of 12 billion euros. At the same time, due to the need
for fiscal consolidation, the government introduced a levy on the banking sector for the
highest-risk liabilities on the balance sheet and decreed a partial transfer of the pension
funds of some institutions to Social Security (APB 2012b, c).
Additionally, as was to be expected, while on the one hand the need to reduce the
transformation ratio required an increase in efforts to attract customer deposits, on the
other hand it placed pressure on the granting of loans. Furthermore, the requirement
to increase solvency levels accentuated the need to deleverage banking activity, as the
difficulty in recourse to the capital markets in normal conditions meant that the financial
1 The core tier 1 capital ratio is a measure of bank solvency, defined by the relation between
a bank’s own funds and its total weighted risk assets.
2 Or the loans-to-deposits ratio, which reflects banks’ ability to convert customers’ deposits
into loans.
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institutions had to achieve this goal by selling non-core assets, reducing their credit
portfolio and/or reducing the average risk of their assets. Because of these limitations,
the banking institutions’ volume of business activity contracted, opposing the expansion
trend of previous years. Indeed, contrary to what occurred in the euro area, the 2008
financial crisis did not slow down the total assets growth of Portuguese banks. However,
Portuguese banks started their deleveraging process after the EAP started. In terms of
balance sheet structure, Portuguese banking institutions also underwent remarkable
changes after 2006, as shown in Table 2.
Table 2 – The Portuguese banking sector’s structural evolution3 (2006–2011)
(thousand €)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Gross Loans 228,031,528 301,118,231 332,202,095 333,067,974 333,587,057 313,951,905
As% of Total Assets 67.45 66.40 68.88 64.61 62.09 60.76
Financial Investments 38,766,135 53,474,997 53,891,671 72,223,977 92,167,250 80,543,343
As% of Total Assets 11.47 11.79 11.17 14.01 17.15 15.59
Deposits from Central Banks 1,739,296 5,731,452 14,407,383 19,418,981 48,788,176 50,723,175
As% of Total Liabilities 0.55 1.35 3.17 4.03 9.71 10.36
Deposits from Customers 156,633,328 201,880,371 219,899,428 220,503,545 232,399,699 246,741,624
As% of Total Liabilities 49.51 47.73 48.44 45.74 46.23 50.40
Source: Bank of Portugal’s Statistical Interactive Database, own calculations
The financial institutions’ borrowing structure (equity and liabilities), in the 2006–
2011 period, continued to be based on deposits from customers, which contributed more
than 50% to their total borrowing in 2011. Moreover, the analysis of funding evolution
shows an increase in the importance of the deposits from customers and from central
banks after the 2008 financial crisis. The main reasons for this performance by cus-
tomers’ deposits are: a) the uncertainty in Portugal and the rest of Europe, which has
generated a preference for lower-risk alternatives on the part of consumers of finan-
cial products and services; b) financial institutions’ strong need to attract more stable
funds, essentially because of the EAP requirement to reduce the transformation ratio,
and the Portuguese financial institutions’ difficulties in accessing the wholesale finance
markets, which led to intensification of the competition to attract deposits. The increase
in funding from central banks reflects the borrowing from the Eurosystem, also a result
of the Portuguese financial institutions’ difficulties in accessing the wholesale finance
markets.
The asset structure shows that, in spite of the importance of loans and advances to
customers, their weight decreased during the period of analysis. The EAP recommenda-
tion to reduce the transformation ratio and the deleveraging process of banking activity
affected the granting of credit, as the risk assessment criteria and loan criteria become
more selective and restrictive. These factors, combined with a natural contraction in the
demand for credit by the non-financial private sector due to the recession, resulted in a
decrease in credit volumes’ trend (Figure 2).
3 Values expressed at current prices; the deflator of the gross domestic product in the period
was 3.2 for 2007, 1.6 for 2008, 0.5 for 2009, 1.1 for 2010 and 1.0 for 2011.
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Figure 2 – Trends in credit in Portugal and in the euro area (Dec. 2005 = 100)
Source: Adapted from APB (2012a).
Figure 2 also shows that during the period that preceded the financial crisis, the
credit volumes followed a strong increasing trend, both in Portugal and in the euro
area. In the summer of 2008, credit growth slowed down, and, in Portugal, it started
decreasing after the second quarter of 2011 (APB 2012a). This reduction in credit has
been more significant for companies and personal loans, especially consumer and other
credit. Smaller private, less capitalized companies are thought to have been the most
affected by the banks’ stricter requirements for lending. At the same time, the banking
sector remained under pressure to meet the funding needs of state-owned companies,
which explains the growth of loans to them (APB 2012b). Figure 3 presents the evolution
of credit by institutional sector, in Portugal, in the 2005–2011 periods. The stocks of
credit to households and non-financial corporations reveal divergent trends from those
verified to the general Government. The agreement on a financial support programme
for Greece in May 2010 seriously worsened the Portuguese Republic’s conditions for
obtaining financing through financial markets. In April 2011, when Portugal asked for
international financial assistance, the credit volumes to the general Government reached
their peak. Additionally, as state-owned entities accounted for almost 10% of the total
debt of non-financial corporations to the resident financial sector in 2011 (against only
6% in 2006), the funding to the Portuguese economy was being swallowed up by public
entities.
The same scenario is presented for financial investment portfolios. After a period
of strong growth between 2008 and 2010, financial investments show a decrease in
2011, partly from the impairment of held-to-maturity investments, due to the statement
of losses arising from the restructuring of Greece’s sovereign debt and the fall in the
share market that resulted in the recognition of impairment of shares held by banking
institutions. In addition, despite the sale of some non-strategic assets due to delever-
aging imperatives, banking institutions maintained a trend in favour of the acquisition
of Portuguese public debt securities (APB 2012b). Indeed, in the first eight months
of 2012, Portuguese banks increased their exposure to Portuguese sovereign debt at
7.4 billion euros (Bank of Portugal’s Statistical Interactive Database). These applications
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Figure 3 – Portuguese trends in credit by institutional sector (Dec. 2005 = 100)
Source: Adapted from APB (2012a).
were carried out with the objective of investment and not due to the need to ensure the
financing of the state. In fact, of that amount, 5.4 billion euros were channelled into
Treasury bonds, which meant that these titles would be acquired in the secondary mar-
ket, given that Portugal has not issued debt in the medium and long term since April
2011.
Summing up, the Portuguese banking industry’s lending and investment be-
haviour is under public scrutiny for political, economic and social reasons. In the next
section, this behaviour is examined.
4 The lending and investment behaviour of Portuguese banking
4.1 Methodology and data
To assess the differences in the Portuguese credit institutions’ lending and invest-
ment behaviour, a statistical analysis was conducted by comparing the sample means,
complemented by the estimation of an empirical model.
The study of banks’ lending and investment behaviour is based on the analysis
of their business model (Ko¨hler 2014). In general, business models describe how banks
generate profits, which customers they serve and which distribution channels they use.
The banking business model is reflected in the structure of their balance sheet (Paulet
and Relano 2010), as shown in Table 3.
The present work makes use of this methodology and focuses the analysis on two
items: clients’ transactions and financial transactions. A higher percentage devoted to
clients’ transactions is typical of a retail-oriented bank. Moreover, the balance between
the clients’ transactions on the liabilities – deposits (savings) – side and the assets –
loans – side is a measure of the risk of the bank lending policy and is fairly characteristic
of a cooperative and mutual savings bank rather than a universal institution. On the
contrary, savings collection and project financing through loans are no longer the core
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Table 3 – Description of the balance sheet in four blocks
Assets Liabilities
Interbank operations Interbank operations
Clients’ transactions Clients’ transactions
Financial transactions Financial transactions
Reserves Equity
Source: Paulet and Relano (2010)
business of institutions that achieve high scores in financial transactions; rather, their
main field of activity is concentrated on the global financial market – investment banks.
For the analysis of the banks’ credit and financial investment activity, three vari-
ables are used: loans-to-deposits ratio, loans to customers and financial investments
(both as a percentage of the total assets). The former intends to reflect the banks’ credit-
granting policy and is a measure of its risk aversion and prudential behaviour. The
second ones reflect the bank’s strategy regarding fund applications and its business
approach to banking activity. It is expected that significant differences between the
different types of banks under study and throughout the time period analysed will be
found. Table 4 presents the variables’ definition.
Table 4 – Variables’ definition
Description
Loans-to-deposits ratio Gross loans/deposits from customers
Loans to customers Loans to customers/assets
Financial investments (Financial assets held for trading + other assets at fair value through profit or loss +
available-for-sale financial assets + held-to-maturity investments and assets with
repurchase agreements)/assets
Prior to the comparison of the sample means, the data are tested for normality
using the Shapiro–Wilk test and, whenever normality applies, the statistic t test is
used for comparisons of two samples and the one-way Anova is used for comparisons of
more than two samples; if normality is violated, the Mann–Whitney test is conducted to
compare two variables and the KrusKal–Wallis test is used to compare more than two
samples. Having determined that differences exist among the samples, the Scheffe post
hoc test is used to identify homogeneous subsets of means that are not different from
each other. To minimize the type I and II errors, a significance level of 0.05 was adopted.
The empirical model assumes the linear regression form and it was constructed
by the estimation of the following function:
Yi,t = F(Cooperative, State, Saving, 2008 Crisis, 2011 EAP)
where Yi,t is the loans-to-deposits ratio, loans to customers or financial investments of
bank i in year t; and the bank type (Cooperative, State and Saving), the 2008_Crisis
and 2011_ EAP are explanatory variables. As the type of bank is a qualitative variable
that assumes four categories, three dummy variables were created (cooperative, state
and saving): the variable cooperative assumes the value of 1 if the bank is a cooperative,
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Table 5 – Variables’ statistics by type of bank
N
Loans-to-deposits ratio Loans to customers Financial investments 
Mean Std deviation Mean Std deviation Mean Std deviation 
Cooperative bank 13 0.8618 0.0270 0.6412 0.0616 0.1779 0.0999 
State-owned bank  13 1.2094 0.0761 0.6386 0.0287 0.2153 0.0124 
Investor-owned bank 39 1.5913 0.2438 0.6726 0.0644 0.1744 0.0553 
Mutual savings bank 13 1.6218 0.2157 0.7870 0.2002 0.1671 0.0695 
Statistic F 54.119 6.846 11.479 
Significance 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Note: Homogeneous subsets of means in  
while the variable state assumes the value of 1 in the case of a state-owned bank and the
variable saving takes the value of 1 in the case of a mutual savings bank. The 2008_crisis
variable measures the effects of the 2008 crisis and takes the value of 1 from 2009 until
the first semester of 2011; the 2011_EAP variable measures the adjustments made by
banks under the 2011 EAP, taking the value of 1 after the first semester of 2011.
The sample includes data regarding a state-owned bank, three privately owned
banks, a mutual savings bank and a cooperative banking system, holding more than
75% of the market share, overall. The data are collected from the company’s half-yearly
balance sheets, from June 20064 to June 2012, i.e. 13 periods, a pool of 76 observations.
The study period (2006–2011) was divided into 3 time periods: a) Period 1, which includes
the data before the 2008 financial crisis (from 2006 to 2008); b) Period 2, which is
from 2009 to the first semester of 2011; and c) Period 3, which encompasses the period
subsequent to the 2011_EAP (after the second semester of 2011).
4.2 Results
The credit institutions studied present similar business models, with their core
centred on retail banking (clients’ transactions) but also operating in the financial mar-
ket (financial transactions), although with different intensities. However, the coopera-
tive bank is the only bank presenting a positive balance between the liabilities and the
assets side for clients’ transactions, meaning that savings collection is greater than loan
distribution. The other banks show dominance of credit-granting activities over savings
activities, even the mutual savings bank, despite its supposed saver profile. Table 5
presents a summary of the statistics of the variables loans-to-deposits ratio, loans to
customers and financial investments by type of bank.
For the loans-to-deposits ratio, three significantly different groups were identified,
including: a) cooperative banks; b) state-owned banks; and c) IOF and mutual savings
banks. The cooperative bank presents a lower ratio of loans to deposits; on the contrary,
4 The data prior to 2006 obey the PCSB (Plano de Contabilidade do Sistema Banca´rio); the
normalization of Portuguese credit institutions according to International Accounting Standards
only took place in 2007. That change in the accounting system had a significant repercussion
for the banking sector balance sheet and income statements, thus undermining any attempt to
include the period before it in the analysis.
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investor-owned and mutual savings banks present a higher loans-to-deposits ratio; and
the state-owned bank scores somewhere between the two. These results are in line with
the expectations given the banks’ different economic objectives, except for the mutual
savings bank, for which the surprisingly high score of the loans-to-deposits ratio can
be somewhat explained by the unique bond that this institution maintains with its
associates–customers entailed in its mutuality nature. Cooperative and state-owned
banks follow a more risk-adverse credit policy as the pressure for shareholders’ profits
is diluted by their economic nature and ownership characteristics. Conversely, an IOF
bank experiences more pressure for shareholders’ returns, compelling its management
to engage in higher leveraging, riskier earning strategies.
For the loans to customers and financial investments variables, two different sta-
tistically significant groups were identified: a) cooperative, state-owned and IOF banks;
and b) mutual savings banks. Mutual savings banks dedicate a higher percentage of
their assets to loans to customers and a lower percentage to financial investments when
compared with their counterparts. On the other hand, cooperative, state and IOF banks
dedicate a lower percentage of their assets to loans to customers and a higher percent-
age to financial investments. This is a surprising result for cooperative and state-owned
banks, particularly concerning the financial investments variable for cooperative banks.
Indeed, although savings banks’ legal restrictions on financial investments can explain
the difference regarding investor and state-owned banks (savings banks can only invest
in companies listed on the Portuguese stock market, limited to 15% of deposits except
for public debt), cooperative banks face similar restrictions.5 Cooperative banks ought
to be different from universal banks, namely because of their history and values. The
specific way in which cooperative banks are organized, their particular system of gov-
ernance and the ultimate goals and underlying principles sustaining their activity are
especially divergent from those of stockholder banks. The problem is that this funda-
mental difference between universal and cooperative banks is becoming diluted over
time. For all banks, their net income is now seen as one of the best indicators of suc-
cess and increasing the market share has become a full-time obsession. It seems as if
the present-day macroeconomic context obliges banks to choose between cooperation or
competition, traditional values or economic efficiency (Paulet and Relano 2010).
This gap between the promises of cooperative banks and what they actually
achieve is confirmed by an inspection of their balance sheet. A loans-to-deposits ratio
less than 1 reflects that savings collection from customers is more important than loan
distribution. Cooperative (and mutual) banks usually function in this way. However, as
far as the transactions in the financial market are concerned, the percentages shown
by the mutual savings bank are clearly lower than those shown by the other types of
bank, even though they are not negligible either. This evidences that for mutual savings
banks, trading on the stock market is not the core of their business. Nevertheless, they
will not hesitate to carry out certain operations on the financial market to improve their
profitability. On the other hand, a comparative analysis of the balance sheets of IOF
5 They can only make applications in public debt in conditions established by the Bank of
Portugal and hold participations: a) in regional unions, Central Credit Cooperative and National
Federation of Credit Cooperatives; b) in enterprises whose object is of regional interest (until 20%
of own funds); c) to assure the reimbursement of credits; and (d) when especially authorized by
the Bank of Portugal.
© 2015 The Authors
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics © 2015 CIRIEC
14 PAULA CABO AND JOA˜O REBELO
and cooperative banks shows no statistically significant differences as regards the core
of their business model. While their main activity is focused on the traditional activities
of granting credit, both banks make ample use of financial markets’ businesses.
When testing for changes in the variables due to the 2008 financial crisis and
the 2011 EAP (Table 6), for a significance level of 5%, no statistically significant differ-
ences are found among the time periods for the variable loans-to-deposits ratio. Indeed,
although a decrease is observed in the loans-to-deposits ratio throughout the time pe-
riods under study, those alterations are not statistically significant. For the loans to
customers and financial investments variables, statistically significant differences are
found among the time periods considered; the post hoc tests grouped them into two
homogeneous subsets of means that are not different from each other: a) Periods 1 and
2, and b) Period 3, for the loans to customers variable; a) Period 1, and b) Periods 2 and
3, for the financial investments variable.
Table 6 – Variables’ statistics by time periods
N
Loans-to-deposits ratio Loans to customers Financial investments 
Mean Std deviation Mean Std deviation Mean Std deviation 
Period 1 36 1.4567 0.3704 0.7024 0.0901 0.1419 0.0637 
Period 2 30 1.4236 0.3403 0.6860 0.0867 0.1841 0.0648 
Period 3 12 1.2436 0.2311 0.6028 0.1637 0.2072 0.0760 
Statistic t 1.785 4.265 5.162 
Significance 0.175 0.018 0.008 
Note: Homogeneous subsets of means in  
Overall, after the 2008 crisis, Portuguese banks began to dedicate a smaller pro-
portion of their assets to loans to customers; however, that decrease was only statistically
significant after the 2011 EAP, which can be explained by the deleveraging process initi-
ated under the programme mentioned. Additionally, following the 2008 financial crisis,
in general, Portuguese credit institutions changed their behaviour in favour of financial
investments; thus, in the periods posterior to 2008, they set aside a high proportion of
their assets for operations in the financial market. This result gives credit to the popular
belief that banks are making a fortune from the sovereign debt crisis given the impos-
sibility of ECB funding states directly, which compels them to submit to the sovereign
debt market speculation, gaining fatter banks, once they are buying (with ECB money)
the debt of states as then the ECB, in turn, buys it from them. It is necessary, however,
to be cautious in accepting this conclusion, as will be explained below.
When the changes in the variables are tested during the time periods by type of
bank6 (Table 7), the results show that there are differences between the time periods,
regarding the variable loans-to-deposits ratio for IOF and mutual savings banks; regard-
ing the variable loans to customers for cooperative and mutual savings banks; and with
regard to the variable financial investments for cooperative and mutual savings banks.
Moreover, the analysis shows that the loans-to-deposits ratio variable experienced a
decrease during the study period, except for the cooperative banks type. This change is
statistically significant for the IOF, cooperative and mutual savings banks types. For the
6 These results should be considered carefully because the groups’ size is small, with a high
probability of type I error occurrence.
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Table 7 – Variables’ statistics by time period and type of bank
N
Loans-to-deposits ratio Loans to customers Financial investments 
Mean Std deviation Mean Std deviation Mean Std deviation 
In
ve
st
or
-
ow
ne
d 
ba
nk
 Period 1 18 1.6377 0.2134 0.6788 0.0579 0.1590 0.0530 
Period 2 15 1.6151 0.2687 0.6734 0.0754 0.1825 0.0560 
Period 3 6 1.3927 0.1807 0.6522 0.0599 0.2003 0.0555 
Statistic t 2.623 0.371 1.555 
Significance 0.086 0.693 0.225 
C
oo
pe
ra
tiv
e 
ba
nk
 
Period 1 6 0.8427 0.0276 0.6840 0.0173 0.0977 0.0279 
Period 2 5 0.8802 0.0127 0.6256 0.0627 0.2242 0.0937 
Period 3 2 0.8733 0.0100 0.5515 0.0059 0.3028 0.0107 
Statistic t 4.564 8.216 10.304 
Significance 0.039 0.008 0.004 
St
at
e-
ow
ne
d 
ba
nk
 
Period 1 6 1.1948 0.1010 0.6240 0.0374 0.2158 0.0142 
Period 2 5 1.2484 0.0314 0.6500 0.0105 0.2173 0.0311 
Period 3 2 1.1562 0.0004 0.6539 0.0069 0.2090 0.0070 
Statistic t 1.323 1.596 0.295 
Significance 0.309 0.250 0.751 
M
ut
ua
l 
sa
vi
ng
s b
an
k Period 1 6
1.7895 0.0931 0.8700 0.0144 0.0608 0.0019 
Period 2 5 1.5678 0.1222 0.8201 0.0343 0.1154 0.0329 
Period 3 2 1.1254 0.0308 0.4549 0.4558 0.0917 0.0565 
Statistic t 21.826 6.263 5.057 
Significance 0.000 0.017 0.030 
Note: Homogeneous subsets of means in  
investor-owned bank type, two groups are identified –: a) Period 1, and b) Periods 2 and
3 –, meaning that the 2008 crisis effects have a deeper statistically significant impact on
this variable than the limit for the transformation ratio imposed by the 2011 EAP. For
mutual savings banks, three groups were identified. It should be take into consideration
that this type of bank is the one that presents the high original value for that variable,
so the adjustments generated by the 2008 crisis effects and 2011 EAP requirements
were more expressive here than in the other types of banks. The cooperative banks
present a different evolution and, overall, the loans-to-deposits ratio shows an increase
during the study periods, identifying two statistically different groups: a) Period 1; and
b) Periods 2 and 3. Historically, cooperative banks have a conservative lending policy
with a transformation ratio below 0.9 (Cabo 2012); the increase in market competition
for customers’ deposits as a result of the Portuguese credit institutions’ difficulty in
accessing capital markets can be the origin of this evolution. Accordingly, it is worth
mentioning the concern of a cooperative bank leader regarding the battle for deposits in
Portuguese banking, questioning the sustainability of the deposit rates offered and its
effect on the sector’s profitability (Expresso 2012). This situation forced, in November
2011, the intervention of the Portuguese supervisor, the Bank of Portugal, by imposing
a limit on the deposit interest rates offered by banks, penalizing the core tier 1 capital
ratio of the institutions that overlapped that boundary (Banco de Portugal 2011).
In general, the variable loans to customers experienced a decrease during the
study period, except for the state-owned bank type, although it is not statistically signif-
icant. The cooperative and mutual savings banks both present a statistically significant
reduction between Period 2 and Period 3, indicating that the 2011 EAP had a deeper
impact on these banks’ activity than the 2008 crisis.
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Overall, the variable financial investments experienced an increase during the
study period, except for the state-owned bank type, although it is not statistically sig-
nificant. The cooperative and mutual savings banks present statistically significant
differences between the time periods under study, identifying two homogeneous subsets
of means: a) Period 1; and b) Periods 2 and 3. As mentioned, this finding gives credit
to the popular belief that banks are making a fortune from the sovereign debt crisis.
However, it must be remembered that for cooperative banks, 2009 was a turning point,
as their new legal regime, approved in that year, introduced major alterations into co-
operative banks’ business activity, namely by allowing individual cooperative banks,
once complying with prudential requirements, to perform several operations that had
been outlawed in the past, in conditions similar to those of universal banks (Cabo 2012).
Table 8 includes the results of the estimation of the linear regression model. Ac-
cording to the value of the statistic F, in the three models, the set of the explanatory
variables is globally significant, corresponding to the expected results, given the preced-
ing statistical analysis.
Table 8 – Linear regression model results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Loans-to-deposits ratio Loans to customers Financial investments
β Std error β Std error β Std error
Constant 1.637∗ 0.037 0.694∗ 0.018 0.149∗ 0.011
Cooperative bank −0.729∗ 0.059 −0.031 0.029 0.003 0.017
State-owned bank −0.382∗ 0.059 −0.034 0.029 0.041∗∗ 0.017
Mutual savings bank 0.030 0.059 0.114∗ 0.029 −0.088∗ 0.017
2008_crisis −0.033 0.046 −0.016 0.023 0.042∗ 0.013
2011_EAP −0.213∗ 0.062 −0.100∗ 0.031 0.059∗ 0.018
Statistic F 39.401∗ 6.757∗ 11.249∗
R2 0.732 0.319 0.439
∗Significance level of 1%; ∗∗significance level of 5%.
For model 1, the variables cooperative and state-owned banks and 2011_EAP
present (negative) estimators that are statistically significant at the 1% significance
level, thus proving to have a significant effect on the variable loans-to-deposits ratio.
Specifically, the value of −0.729 for the cooperative bank estimator indicates that the dif-
ference in the loans-to-deposits ratio between the cooperative banks and the other bank
types is −0.729, ceteris paribus. Thus, for the same time period (and other factors influ-
encing the loans-to-deposits ratio), cooperative banks present a lower loans-to-deposits
ratio than other types of banks. The same is true for the case of state-owned banks, al-
though their influence is smaller (−0.382). Finally, the 2011_EAP variable also proved to
influence the loans-to-deposits ratio negatively as, keeping other factors influencing the
loans-to-deposits ratio constant, it takes a lower score (−0.213) for the period following
the 2011 EAP.
For model 2, only the variables mutual savings bank and 2011_EAP show the
estimators to be statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. The estimator for
the dummy explanatory variable mutual savings bank has a positive value (of 0.114),
meaning that mutual savings banks set aside a higher proportion of their assets for loans
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to customers than other types of banks. Moreover, the 2011_EAP variable proved, as in
model 1, to influence the dependent variable negatively, i.e., all other factors remaining
constant, in the 2011 EAP period, the loans to customers were lower than in other
periods.
For model 3, the variables mutual savings and state-owned banks and the vari-
ables 2008_crisis and 2011_EAP present estimators that are statistically significant at
the 1% significance level, thus proving to have a significant effect on the variable fi-
nancial investments. For the explanatory variable mutual savings banks, the effect is
negative (-0.088), indicating that this type of bank dedicates a lower proportion of its
assets to financial investments than other types of banks. The positive estimator of the
state-owned variable indicates that this type of bank allocates a higher proportion of
its assets to financial investments than other types of banks, although it is a smaller
absolute standardized coefficient, indicating that it contributes less to the model. The
time period variables both present positive values for the estimators, proving that the
2008 crisis and 2011 EAP had the effect of increasing the relative importance of financial
investments assets to the banks’ activity.
5 Conclusion
In general, it may be concluded that universal (IOF and state-owned) and cooper-
ative and mutual savings banks’ lending and investment behaviour in a time of crisis
only differ in terms of the quantitative percentage of their different banking activities,
but the overall business models applied are qualitatively identical. Ultimately, they are
not that different. Even if mutual and cooperative banks continue to claim that they
share fundamental values that make them a very special kind of financial institution,
the figures show that in their day-to-day practice, they are quite similar to their uni-
versal counterparts. The main differences in their business models are the clear saver
profile of cooperative banks and the deeper focus on loans to customers to the detriment
of financial investment activities by the mutual savings bank.
Regarding the change in behaviour as a result of the particularly difficult cir-
cumstances of the Portuguese economy, the only type of institution that presented the
desirable evolution, although the change was not deep enough to be statistically signifi-
cant, was the state-owned bank type. The other credit institutions’ changes do not follow
the public opinion requests or their own marketing discourse.
The short period of the analysis is a disadvantage and shortcoming for which future
investigation, able to widen it, will increase the findings’ robustness. Further research
can also complement this study’s findings, namely by analysing credit institutions’ credit
and financial investments portfolio and including non-domestic credit institutions.
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